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SUMMARY
This book is about the principle of legality in European criminal law. It is divided 
into three Parts and eight Chapters. The fi rst Part is introductory and it is comprised 
of two Chapters, where the research topic and the methodology are set out (Chapter 
I and II respectively).
Chapter 1 introduces and explains the central topic of this research. The 
principle of legality is a keystone doctrine of national criminal justice systems. In 
short, the principle means that there is no crime without law. It has two functions; it 
legitimises the use of criminal law powers by the state (legitimising function) and it 
infl uences the operation of criminal law normatively (normative function). This 
principle legitimises the use of state powers by defi ning the concept of law as 
opposed to state force. It concretises the application of other important values or 
principles, which are often considered the theoretical rationales of the principle of 
legality. These include the Rule of Law, the separation of powers, democracy, and 
the principle of individual liberty and autonomy. Chapter 1 highlights that this 
principle may elicit different interpretations, depending on how one defi nes its 
legitimising role. Normatively, the principle of legality defi nes the sources of 
criminal liability and it guides the use of the discretionary powers by state actors. 
Four prohibitions stem from it, namely the prohibition of customary criminal 
liability, of retroactive criminalisation, of vaguely prescribed behaviour and fi nally, 
the prohibition of extensive interpretation by courts.
Whereas the legality principle is fundamentally important for the criminal 
justice systems, its interpretation and application in European criminal law is 
incoherent and incomplete. European criminal law is an area still in progress and 
increasingly more criminal law powers are entrusted to European state actors. 
Chapter I explains further the realm of European criminal law. The existence and 
nature of these powers demand that they are employed legitimately. The current 
application of the principle of legality in EU law is fragmentary. Many of its 
normative functions have already been developed judicially but these do not apply 
coherently at all instances. More importantly though, there has been very little 
discussion on the legitimation of the European criminal justice system and the 
conditions under which European criminal law is distinguished from state violence. 
The research question is, therefore, to examine the interpretation and application of 
the principle of legality in European criminal law. In particular, the research aims at 
examining the possible legitimising and normative functions of the European 
legality principle. It is to be noted that this research does not aim at replacing 
national doctrines, albeit a degree of infl uence should be expected. Furthermore, 
some limitations of this research are addressed. In this book, I examine the principle 
of legality as applied to courts and the legislator and not to the executive. Its 
application to sanctions is also excluded.
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Chapter II deals with the methodology, which follows the nature of this principle 
in EU law. The legality principle is a human right codifi ed in Article 49 of the 
Charter but it is also a general principle of EU law. These are distinctive European 
principles that have a double pedigree; they stem from national constitutional 
traditions and standards from international instruments (mainly the ECHR). 
General principles of EU law are frequently built in a bottom-up manner while they 
are also seen as open doctrines that can be adapted to the European system. 
Essentially this approach is also followed in this book. To translate this approach 
into methodological terms, I employ the concept of legal transplant. This is a 
phenomenon where a principle, a norm or an institution is transplanted in another 
system and thereby adapted. In this Chapter, I concretise further this process by 
referring to the concept of cross-fertilisation. The latter is similar to legal 
transplants but as a methodological concept it focuses more on the adaptation of 
legal concepts and their dynamic evolution within the new legal order. I argue that 
by employing the concept of legal transplant, or the process of cross-fertilisation, 
the analysis of the legality principle at the EU level becomes transparent and open 
to critical analysis.
Next to this, I distinguish three methodological steps. The fi rst step is the 
national comparative research, which includes three national systems: the English, 
the Dutch and the German. The aim of the fi rst step is to identify how the normative 
and legitimising functions of this principle operate in the national systems. The 
modus operandi, problems, and different existing approaches are to be analysed. 
The second step is the examination of the existing fragments of the EU system. In 
this step, the principle of legality is expected to be fragmentary and therefore a 
more critical analysis of the lacunae and the existing questions is necessary. The 
third and fi nal step is the internal adaptation, where the principle of legality is 
adapted to the European legal system. This step requires that one respects certain 
parameters that defi ne this system, which conclude Chapter II.
Part II deals with the national comparative research and it includes three 
Chapters. In Chapter III, the theoretical rationales of the principle of legality are 
analysed. The principles of individual autonomy and liberty, democracy, separation 
of powers, the Rule of Law, legal certainty, and guilt are examined. The aim of this 
Chapter is two-fold. Its goal is to explain the foundations of the legality principle 
but also to explore their different interpretations. Different interpretations of these 
concepts may change the legitimising and normative role of the principle of legality.
Different theories regarding individual liberty and autonomy are presented, the 
most central being the distinction between positive and negative liberty. Negative 
liberty means the absence of obstacles, while positive liberty entails the presence of 
something, i.e. elements that improve the capacity of the individual to act. Negative 
liberty represents the traditional understanding of liberty, and criminal law is 
therefore a threat to liberty. The relationship between positive liberty and the state 
are diffi cult to regulate, however, I argue that balancing them is essential. The 
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concepts of predictability and legal certainty are further discussed. Additionally, 
the vertical and horizontal dimensions of criminal law are discussed.
The analysis of the democratic principle focuses on the elaboration of its 
assumptions, such as equality and political autonomy, and the expositions of two 
modern approaches. The procedural concept of democracy means that democratic 
procedures suffi ce to secure political autonomy and self-determination of 
individuals and communities. The substantive concept holds that, next to 
procedures, a substantive respect of human dignity and minimum respect of 
individual rights is also important. Essentially a similar confl ict is also presented 
for the Rule of Law, where there have been various substantive and formal theories. 
I argue that both practically and dogmatically a strict formalistic or procedural 
approach cannot be reconciled with modern legal systems.
For the notion of separation of powers, I present the theory of Montesquieu and 
its different interpretations. A strict approach of separating the powers cannot be 
reconciled with modern legal systems but also the theory of Montesquieu itself. A 
system of checks and balances, on the other hand, where no power gains overall 
control refl ects better the doctrine of the separation of powers. I conclude that a 
model where courts have a moderate dynamism is preferable to systems where 
courts have no discretion at all, or absolute control.
This Chapter ends with the principle of guilt and legal certainty. Regarding the 
principle of guilt, which has been frequently mixed with the principle of legality, I 
argue that instead of trying to strictly demarcate these two principles, an appraisal 
of their doctrinal interaction is more pragmatic. It also prevents the distortion of the 
concept of foreseeability, which both principles essentially safeguard at different 
levels. Regarding the principle of legal certainty, I analyse its different 
interpretations and subdivisions. What should be highlighted is that this principle 
may be understood as requiring predictability (e.g. non-retroactivity or clarity of 
norms) but it may also require acceptability, namely that criminal law is what is 
expected and accepted to be.
In Chapter IV, the focus is on the interpretation and application of the principle 
to national law. The three different systems are presented in an integrative manner, 
as the aim is to identify the modus operandi of this principle in national law. The 
Chapter is divided into two main sections. In the fi rst one, the differences and 
similarities of continental and common law countries are presented. It becomes 
evident that this principle did not exist as such in common law, however, this did 
not prevent this system from developing functionally equivalent notions. What is 
also striking is that arbitrariness is conceptualised differently in both traditions, 
next to key rationales such as the separation of powers. Regulating the sources of 
criminal liability is an important function of the principle in the continental 
traditions. However, this element was absent in the traditional common law. Having 
said that, it is also shown that both traditions have come closer together, especially 
under the infl uence of the ECHR. In particular, continental systems have developed 
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certain de facto common law trends and the principle of legality is currently a 
doctrine of English law.
Analysis of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence shows that it brought the traditions closer 
to each other, and most importantly, it advanced a novel interpretation of the 
principle of legality, which is also prevalent in national law. The ‘rights-conception’ 
brings to the foreground the human right nature of this principle. As a human right, 
its application depends on a variety of factors that are further explained in this 
Chapter, the most important being that the principle is weighed with other rights. 
This essentially brings within this principle a substantive connotation as foreseeable 
criminalisation depends on the individual rights that are protected with criminal 
law. In addition, the sources of criminal liability are less important in the ‘rights-
conception’ of the legality principle where the focus is shifted to qualitative 
elements such as foreseeability. Evidently, the ECtHR’s ‘rights-conception’ has 
been partly incorporated in national law infl uence in different ways the 
interpretation of this doctrine.
In the second section, further research of the current application of the legality 
principle is conducted. The analysis reveals that in national law the principle of 
legality is eroding as its different aspects do not consistently comply with their 
dogmatic expectations. Much attention is paid to the lex certa and lex stricta 
elements. It is shown that courts have much more powers than what the traditional 
interpretation of this principle would allow. In addition, the courts’ activity 
demands further guarantees be established against possible abuse. This becomes 
especially evident in the prohibition of analogy. It appears that courts make use of 
different techniques to legitimise their decisions, such as an appreciation of legal 
interests involved and their proper balance within the legal order. In short, it appears 
that the principle of legality is lacking tools to properly address certain dangers. 
This problem is further traced to the theoretical construction of this doctrine.
In Chapter V, the principle of legality is critically discussed in the light of three 
models of justice. These models as analytical tools to reconstruct the doctrine of the 
principle in order to compensate for its failures as discussed in the previous Chapter. 
Each takes a different approach to the interpretation of the theoretical rationales as 
presented to in Chapter III and the function of the legality principle as presented in 
Chapter IV. The models refl ect roughly the traditional confl ict in legal philosophy 
between formalism, pragmatism, and relational theories.
The classical model of criminal justice adheres to legal formalism, i.e. the 
legitimacy of the law is found in past decisions. Law should not be adapted to 
current developments because legal certainty is important. Principles and rules are 
separate concepts. In the classical model, a strict separation of powers and a 
formalistic understanding of the Rule of Law and democracy apply. Criminal law is 
legitimate when the vertical relationships between the individual and the state are 
regulated. Therefore, it is mainly through its protective fi nality that criminal law 
fi nds legitimacy. In the instrumentalism model, criminal law fi nds legitimacy in its 
pragmatic contemporary relevance. The instrumental goals of criminalisation are 
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the main source of legitimacy and the protection against arbitrariness does not play 
a role in the legitimacy of criminal law. Substantive interpretation of the Rule of 
Law and democracy apply, while courts have increased powers. Finally, in the 
relational model of criminal justice the legitimacy of criminal law is found in the 
mediation between the instrumental and protective fi nalities of criminal law. 
Transparency and controllability of decision-making is important so that decisions 
are tested for arbitrary balancing of rights. In this model, a less strict separation of 
powers doctrine is favoured.
The legality principle in these three models functions differently. A comparison 
between the three models shows that the relational model is a more defensible 
approach for criminal law’s legitimacy. In a relational model the character of this 
doctrine as a principle is accentuated, as principles remain open doctrines that must 
be concretised. It is a steering principle that guides construction and interpretation 
of criminal liability. This entails that as a principle it includes the weighing of the 
relevant interests of criminalisation. Its functions are enriched with further 
elements, such as a claim towards transparency during interpretation where courts 
must follow a transparent reasoning by differentiating between principles, policies 
and rights. The masking of opportunistic policies as more legitimate elements is 
therefore avoided. In addition, within a relational model the principle of legality 
addresses the problem of casuistry of jurisprudence. It is further explained that 
courts can methodically improve their interpretation to avoid casuistic development 
of criminal liability. The Chapter concludes with a general evaluation of the legality 
principle in the chosen relational model and the usefulness of the models of criminal 
justice as analytical tools.
In the third Part the focus is shifted to EU criminal law. The aim of this last part 
is to analyse and reconstruct the principle of legality in EU law. Part 3 is divided 
into three Chapters. Chapter VI follows an analysis similar to Chapter IV where the 
modus operandi in EU law is assessed. It is important that one establishes the 
current nature and application of the legality principle but also pin-point its lacunae. 
The Chapter is structured following the different aspects of the legality principle. 
One of the main problems is the lack of appropriate theoretical support. The 
principle of legality is often associated with or considered a part of other broader 
doctrines, such as legal certainty or legal expectations. Some of its function cannot 
be explained without further theoretical analysis. For example, why would this 
principle apply also to Directives when these are not addressed to individuals?
Normatively there are some important lacunae and inconsistencies. For example, 
there is no unifi ed approach regarding the sources of criminal liability in EU law, 
whilst there are certain elements such as implementation guidelines that are not yet 
developed. For example, the principle of conform interpretation presents certain 
dogmatic diffi culties especially due to the contra legem requirement. What is also 
pointed out in Chapter VI is that this principle must function in a two-level system, 
which is rather challenging as the way in which national and European legal orders 
interact is not too clear. Special attention is paid to the dissemination of tasks 
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between European and national institutions, namely the ECJ and national courts, 
and the European and national legislators.
After laying down the current problems of this doctrine in the inventory of 
Chapter VI, the analysis is taken at the theoretical level in Chapter VIII where the 
legitimation of EU criminal law and justice system is examined. The aim is to 
understand the constitutional and theoretical elements of the criminal justice 
systems within which a European legality principle should operate. Chapter VII is 
divided into two main sections. In the fi rst section the legitimacy of the EU criminal 
justice system and its relationship to the national legal orders are discussed. In the 
second section, a relational model for European criminal justice is advocated. The 
Chapter begins with an analysis of the current legitimation patterns of the EU 
criminal justice system. Instrumental motivation plays an important role in the 
legitimacy of this system as its nature and justifi cation is politically annexed to the 
internal market. This is shown through an analysis of the spill-over theory; namely 
that the AFSJ is necessary because the internal market had a spill-over on crime 
control. Essentially, crime control and security are of importance for such EU 
system. What is missing is the protective fi nality of EU criminal law. This has been 
slowly emerging and evidences are presented from the ne bis in idem principle and 
other areas of EU criminal law. Some problems of the protective dimension of EU 
criminal law are also presented. If there is such an aspect to this system, then what 
short of protection will the EU afford to its citizens?
The Chapter continues with an analysis of the interaction between the EU and 
national legal orders where three existing theories are presented. Within these 
theories several other relevant doctrines, such as European citizenship, democracy 
and the legitimation of criminal law are discussed. The theory of EU supremacy 
supports the superiority of the EU legal order over the national one. The theory of 
democratic statism advances the importance of national legal orders as the sole 
basis for criminal law legitimacy. They theory of constitutional pluralism suggests 
that both European and national legal orders have a claim of legitimacy. The latter 
theory values a relational approach of European citizenship where EU law becomes 
the means to mediate between excessive nationalism and excessive unifi cation.
In the second section, the impact of the classical and the instrumentalist models 
is discussed and a relational model for European criminal justice is presented. Such 
model is based on an assumption of pluralism of legal orders and of sources of 
legitimacy and it represents a furthering of the ECtHR’s ‘rights-conception’, an 
approach prevalent amongst EU and national legal orders. The main characteristics 
of this model are presented. The European protective dimension of EU criminal law 
is reconstructed. It involves a strengthening of the vertical aspect, where individuals 
are protected from arbitrariness from both the EU and the national authorities, and 
a horizontal aspect, where the crime control element is reinterpreted in the light of 
the European demos. Further elements, such as legal certainty and the justifi cation 
of harmonisation of criminal offences are examined. The Chapter concludes with 
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an appreciation of the theoretical rationales of the legality principle in EU law and 
the general features of such principle.
The function of the European legality principle within such EU criminal justice 
system (based on a relational model of justice) is further developed in the last part 
of this book. Chapter VIII focuses exclusively on the legitimising and normative 
function of the European legality. An additional element, the distributive function, 
is added as explained in Chapter VII. The legitimising function consists of 
guidelines regarding the use of criminal law competences by the European 
legislator. It highlights the steering character of this principle. Focus is paid to the 
currently opportunistic character of the systems. What is suggested from this is that 
the EU legislator must assess substantially the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and make a distinction between policies and rights. EU policies are 
not excluded from the legitimation of EU criminal law but they should be 
distinguished and their possible translation to rights addressed.
The distributive function addresses the problem of justifying the current multi-
level system and how the European and national authorities should divide their roles 
in constructing and interpretation criminal liability. The normative function delves 
deeper to the function of the aspects of the legality principle. Key questions raised 
in Chapter VI are answered here. An important feature is that the European legality 
principle supports the statute as a source of criminal liability, but it also recognises 
case law as an active participant. As a tool against casuistry, a form of precedence 
is suggested for the ECJ. Transparency in judicial interpretation is essential for both 
the ECJ in preliminary rulings and national courts. Especially with the principle of 
conform interpretation, the suggestion is to delete the problematic contra legem 
element. Finally, the aspects of lex certa are further analysed. A solution for the 
requirement of precision of Directives is suggested. In addition, the pressing need 
of harmonising rules on jurisdiction is analysed. The Chapter ends with conclusions 
that summarise key points of the book but also refl ect upon certain choices made, 
such as the methodology of this book and the use of models of justice. Final 
conclusions include possible directions for further research in this fi eld.
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